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I. Introduction
Effective Use of Class Action
Procedures in California
Toxic Tort Litigation
Donald C. Arbitblit and
William Bernstein
In recent years. Northern California has been the site of
several catastrophic industrial incidents that exposed large
numbers of people to toxic chemicals, resulting in complex
class action litigation. These events have included the
release of a chemical mixture from a processing tower at the
Unocal Refinery in Rodeo, California, between August 22,
1994 and September 6. 1994:1 the discharge of sulfuric acid
mist from a rail car at the General Chemical Corporation
(GCC) plant in Richmond, California, on July 26. 19932: and
the Sacramento River spill of July 14, 1991. in which a train
derailed near the Northern California town of Dunsmuir.3
California courts, like those of many other states, have
recognized that the class action device provides a superior
method of resolving the enormous number of claims that can
anse from a mass toxic disaster. The class procedure has per-
mitted resolution of such incidents within two to three
years-from the date of the disaster until claims are paid. In
the GCC and Sacramento River Spill cases, the class mechanism
was applied to effectively resolve the litigation by defining
the class of persons entitled to recover damages, and pro-
viding for fair, equitable and prompt distribution of settle-
ment funds. The principal benefits of the class device are: (1)
elimination of the need for hundreds or thousands of plain-
tiffs to repeat the same proof as to common issues, thereby
resulting in significant savings of time and moneyforthe par-
ties and the courts: (2) achievement of global resolution by
encompassing all claims (except for those of opt outs) with-
in a single proceeding; and (3) court supervised distribution
of both compensatory and punitive damages to all class
members, thereby eliminating the race to the courthouse.
This article summarizes applicable California law con-
ceming the use of the class action device in mass toxic disas-
ters, discusses some of the factors that make the class action
device superior in these cases, and provides useful informa-
tion to practitioners concerning the factual and legal issues
that commonly arise in these important and complex matters.
0 Mr. Bernstein (l.D.. University of San Francisco Law School. 1975)
and Mr. Arbitblit (J.D.. Boalt Hall School of Law 1979) are members of the
firm of Ueff. Cabraser. Heimann & Bernstein. a San Francisco law firm that
has served as court-appointed lead counsel andor class counsel in numer-
ous toxic tort class actions. including the Unocal. GCC and Sacramento Rier
Spill cases referenced herein.
1. In re Unocal Refinerjy Litigation: No. C-94-04141 (Contra Costa
County Super. CL Jan. 10. 1996). Approxmately 40 complaints have been
consolidated and are pending. In January 1996. the Court issued an Order
denying defendants demurrer to class action allegations.
2. In re GCC Richmond Works Cases. No. 2906 (Contra Costa County
Super. CL Nov. 22. 1995). On No. ember 22. 1995. the Court (Hon. Richard L
Patsey) Issued an Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of Class
Settlement and implementing Pretrial Orders. The Courts Order has been
appealed, and appeals are pending.
3. in reSacramento RiverSpill Cases No. I & ii. Nos. 2617 and 2620 (S.F
Super. CL Sept. 20. 1993). On September 20. 1993. the Court issued an Order
of Final Approval of Settlement on a dasswide basis. Appeals from that
Order were voluntarily dismissed prior to any appellate decisions, and the
Order of Final Approval as the subject of a final judgment.
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II. Certification of Mass Torts Under California Law
A. Federal Precedents Allow Class Certification in
Mass Toxic Tort Cases.
In the past, state and federal courts often
adopted the reasoning of a 1966 Federal Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, 4 to the effect that mass torts were
usually not suitable for class certification. 5
However, by the early 1980's, Professor Charles Alan
Wright, one of the most distinguished members of
that committee, had become "profoundly con-
vinced" that the Advisory Committee's position was
mistaken. Instead, Professor Wright stated that
"[ulnless we can use the class action and devices
built on the class action, our judicial system is sim-
ply not going to be able to cope with the challenge
of the mass repetitive wrong... "6 Similarly in 1986,
Professor Herbert Newberg, author of the definitive
treatise on class actions,7 found that "Imlass tort
class actions are rapidly emerging as a way to han-
dle claims resulting from negligent acts or defective
or toxic products affecting groups of similar par-
ties."8 Professor Newberg's change of heart coincid-
ed with a judicial trend approving the class device
in the mass tort setting. For example, in In re A.H.
Robins, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited
Newberg's revised opinion in support of its own
conclusion that the courts were properly "abandon-
ing their historical reluctance to certify mass tort
class actions in light of what is often an overwhelm-
ing need to create an orderly, efficient means for
adjudicating hundreds or thousands of related
claims."9
In Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,"o the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a landmark decision
which approved of class certification on issues of
liability and punitive damages in litigation involv-
Ing multiple asbestos exposure claims." Jenkins
acknowledged that prior decisions had rejected
class certification in the mass accident or tort set-
ting primarily because of differences between indi-
vidual plaintiffs' damages. However, citing the need
to "change and invent" in response to new condi-
tions, the court ultimately held that class certifica-
tion was "clearly superior to the alternative of
repeating, hundreds of times over," the proof of lia-
bility and science issues common to all plaintiffs,12
Accordingly, the Court found that the class had
been properly certified as to such common issues,
while reserving individual issues of damage for later
minitnals. 3 In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation,14
the Sixth Circuit similarly held that a toxic exposure
case resulting from ground water contamination
was properly certified as a class action because of
the predominance of common issues of liability,
punitive damages and the toxic nature of the chem-
icals to which plaintiffs were exposed. 5
Together, A.H. Robins, Jenkins and Sterling provide
persuasive authority for the modern view that class
actions are a superior alternative to the traditional
method of case-by-case adjudication in mass tort
toxic exposure cases.
B. California Appellate Decisions Concerning Class
Actions In Mass Tort Cases.
The California Supreme Court has never issued
a specific ruling on the applicability of the class
action device in mass toxic tort cases in this state.
Some older California decisions Indicate the same
resistance to the class device that was previously
found in federal mass tort cases, and those deci-
sions commonly cite the above-referenced Federal
Rules Advisory Committee Note as authority for
denying class certification.' 6 Moreover, in a case
involving the question of whether the statute of lim-
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (28 U.S.CA § 23).
5. See, e.g., Rose v. Medtronics, Inc.. 107 Cal.App. 3d i50, i55
(1980). Rose involved allegedly defective pacemakers. The court
upheld a demurrer to class certification, citing the Advisory
Committee note.
6. in re School Asbestos Iitigation, Master File No. 83-0286,
Tr. at 106 (E.D. PA) (Statement of Professor Charles Alan Wnght,
class action argument, July 30, 1984) (quoted in In reA.H. Robins,
880 F.2d 709, 731 (4th Cir. 1989)).
7. HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcnONS (3d ed.
1992).
8. Herbert B. Newberg, Mass Tort Class Actions, TRiAL, Feb.
1986, at 53,
9. In re A. H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 731-732. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 and all case law thereunder has been express-
ly adopted by the Califomia Supreme Court for use by the state's
tnal courts in making their class certification decisions. See
Vasquez v. Supenor Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800,
821 (1971). Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709 (1967): see
also Bell v. Amencan Title Ins. Co., 226 Cal, App. 3d 1589, 1603
(1991); NEwBERG, supra note 7, § 13.17. In 1970 the California
Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1781, which is identical to
Federal Rule 23 with respect to its class certi/icatlon prerequi-
sites. See Schneider v. Vennard, 183 Cal, App. 3d 1340, 1345
(1986). While section 1781 expressly applies to consumer class
actions, its enactment is indicative of California's adoption of
federal law pertaining to class actions of any kind. See Vasquez,
4 Cal.3d at 820.
10. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
11. Id. at 473.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
15. Id. at 1196-97.
16. See, e.g., Rose, 107 Cal. App. 3d at 154-155 (class action
denied as to alleged heart pacemaker defects).
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itations had been tolled by the filing of a class
action, the California Supreme Court stated, in dicta,
that personal injury claims are generally inappropn-
ate for class treatment.17
Despite these older authorities, the more
recent California Supreme Court decisions in
Chnstiansen v. Superor Court,'8 and Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co.. Inc.19 offer support for the emerging
view that class actions are appropriate in mass tort
cases, including those alleging toxic exposure. In
Christiansen, a personal injury case involving over
16.000 claims for emotional distress ansing from
the mishandling of cremated remains, the Court
stated, "[tlhe class of potential plaintiffs we approve here is
'limited in number. ,..,"2 Following the Supreme
Court decision, the trial court certified a class for
settlement purposes. 2i Thus. individual issues per-
taining to emotional distress in Chnstiansen did not
preclude class certification, because of the predom-
inating'common issues pertaining to liability and
punitive damages for a continuing course of con-
duct by defendants.
In Potter v. Firestone, the California Supreme
Court addressed the availability of damages for fear
of cancer and medical monitonng, where plaintiffs
had been exposed to drinking water contaminated
with carcinogens from a nearby toxic dump.
Although the case was not filed as a class action,
the court referred to the "class of potential plain-
tiffs" on numerous occasions, noting that -a single
class action may easily involve hundreds, if not
thousands, of fear of cancer claims."z2 The court
also expressed its concern that if fear of cancer
damages were awarded "in large class actions, lia-
bility for this one type of injury alone would be stag-
gering."23 Significantly, the court resolved this
dilemma by adopting pleading standards that
would impose limitations on the size of the poten-
tial class of plaintiffs, rather than by rejecting the
use of the class action device in toxic exposure
cases. In particular, the court held that a toxic expo-
sure plaintiff who could only show negligent con-
duct by the defendant was required to demonstrate
"that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will
develop the cancer in the future due to the toxic
exposure," in order to recover for fear of cancer. 4
Alternatively, if the plaintiff could demonstrate that
the defendant's conduct met the standard for puni-
tive damages under California Civil Code Section
3294. the plaintiff could recover for fear of cancer
upon proof of exposure, significant increase in
plaintiff's risk of cancer, and a reasonable fear cor-
roborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion,
without having to prove that plaintiff would "more
likely than not" develop cancer25
While neither Clnstiansen or Potter specifically
ruled on a class certification order in the context of a
mass tort or toxic exposure case, each decision
arguably provides implicit authority that such cases
are appropriate for class treatment, by approving
classes of potential plaintiffs and declining to take the
obvious opportunity to reject the possibility of class
certification. However. a very recent appellate deci-
sion raises numerous questions as to the state of
mass tort class certification law in California. In
Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation,26 plaintiffs
sought to certify a personal injury class against Baxter
and others in connection with allergies and medical
problems allegedly related to repeated exposure to
latex gloves. The trial court dismissed the class alle-
gations on demurrer and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision.27 In affirming, the
Court of Appeal cited Clausen v. San Francisco Un4jed
Sdwol District2s which held that "the wide disparity in
individual claimants' damages and the diverse issues
of liability and causation as to each individual
claimant preclude maintenance of the suit as a class
action."2 The Kennedy decision also cited Jolly v. Eli Lilly
Company.30 wherein the California Supreme Court
stated a similar view in dicta.3i
In Kennedy. the Court of Appeal noted that
'iwhat is critical is whether common issues pre-
dominate. In some mass torts, that question may be
answered in the affirmative, while in others individ-
ual questions may outnumber common ques-
tions."- The court then made extensive references
17. jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 44 Cal. 3d 1103. 1122-1123 (1988).
18. 54 Cal. 3d 868 (1991)
19. 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993).
20. 54 Cal. 3d. at 900 (emphasis added). The class had not
yet been certified at the time of the Supreme Court's decision in
Christiansen. However. the court's opinion stated that it approved'
the class and made repeated references to the propriety of class
certification, from which its implicit acceptance of the class may
be inferred.
21. Sconce/Lamb Cremation Cases. No. 2085 (LA. Super. Ct.
Mar. 24. 1992).
22. 6 Cal. 4th at 991.
23. Id. at 993.
24. Id. at 997.
25. Id. at 997-1000.
26. No. C018845. 1996 Cal. App. LEXIS 245 (N.D. Cal. Fed.
28. 1996).
27. Id. at 2.
28. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1990).
29. I. at 1234.
30.44 Cal. 3d. 1103 (1988).
31. Ktnn dy, 1996 Cal. App. LEXIS 245. at 1 16-17.
32. Id. at 116 n.6.
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to the eviddntiary record, which demonstrated the
predominance of individual questions in that case.
For example, the latex gloves were manufactured by
several companies throughout the United States,
Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia, raising ques-
tions about variations from uniform manufacturing
formulae. Moreover, questions were also raised as
to whether each defendant knew, or should have
known, that the product could have caused injury to
plaintiffs. "The question of liability for each defen-
dant thus turns on separate factual issues."33
Individual statute of limitations issues were also
raised because many workers had used latex gloves
for a period of time exceeding the statutory pen-
od.34 Establishment of a breach of warranty would
have required plaintiffs to provide individual proof
of privity, by showing that they purchased the
gloves directly from the defendants' distributors.3'
The Court of Appeal also focused on individual
questions as to causation and damages: why some
plaintiffs suffered only minor skin irritation while
others suffered life-threatening allergic reactions;
whether registered nurses who suffered minor skin
irritation might have believed that the reaction was
due to the latex gloves but decided to wear the
gloves to protect against other hazards; and most
importantly, the fact that latex is a common material
found in countless products which may have caused
or contributed to plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Thus,
plaintiffs could have suffered the allergic reactions by
using dishwashing or gardening gloves at home, or
through contact with "balloons, paint, condoms,
clothing or any of numerous other latex items."36
Finally, the court took note of defense expert evi-
dence that allergic reactions may have been caused
by the interaction of latex with certain foods, bring-
ing into question the diet of each plaintiff.37
The Kennedy decision may present both an
obstacle to, and an opportunity for, plaintiffs
seeking to certify classes in mass toxic tort cases.
On the one hand, Kennedy endorses, and arguably
revitalizes, the holdings and dicta of cases that
predate Chnstiansen and Potter to the effect that
mass torts are not well-suited for class certifica-
tion. On the other hand, Kennedy is the first
California appellate decision to explicitly
acknowledge that common questions may pre-
dominate in some mass torts,3 8 and counsel seek-
ing to certify a class could readily distinguish the
33. Id. at * 18.
34. Id. at * 19.
35. Id. at • 18-19.
36. id. at 1 19-20.
37. Id. at "20.
facts of most mass toxic torts from those that
were presented in Kennedy itself.
For example, mass toxic disasters, such as the
Sacramento River Spill or General Chemii:al sulfuric acid
discharge, commonly involve exposure to chemicals
as a result of a single course of conduct by a single
defendant. Thus, there would be no individual
questions as to exposure to the different formula-
tions used by various manufacturers, and liability
would turn on a single set of facts as to all plaintiffs.
Because accidents discharge chemicals that are not
usually present in plaintiffs' envi'onments, the
court would not be faced with the confounding
effect of individual plaintiffs' histories of exposuies
to similar compounds from other products. Where
the complaint involves a single incident, all plain-
tiffs would be subject to the same statute of limita-
tions, in contrast to the ongoing exposures and
individual limitations issues in Kennedy. Industrial
accidents generally do not involve claims for breach
of warranty, because the product is not being used
in its intended fashion when it escapes from a con-
tainer and causes environmental exposures, and
thus the problematic individual issues of privity
found in Kennedy would be absent in most mass
toxic tort cases.
The primary issues raised by Kennedy which are
likely to exist in any mass toxic tort case, and which
may be troublesome to a California court consider-
ing class certification, are those pertaining to cau-
sation and damages. While the Kennedy decision
expressed concern about those subjects, the court
did not find that individual issues of clamages alone
would defeat class certification. Thus, the question
remains as to the effect of such issues on class cer-
tification under California law.
There are two distinct approaches to resolve
this apparent conflict between individual issues of
causation and the requirement that common issues
predominate in order to certify a class. The modern
view, espoused by Robins, Sterling and Jenkins, is that
a class may be certified with respect to the common
questions of liability and punitive damages, while
individual matters pertaining to causation and
compensatory damages are reserved for summary
proceedings after the trial of common issues) 9
Some California courts have approved of this proce-
dure.40 However, in light of the uncertainty of
California appellate authority as to tl'e acceptabili-
38. Id. at * 17 n.6.
39. See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 E2d at 473-474: Sierling, 855 E2d at
1196-97.
40. See. e.g., Alviso Community Org. v Maciel, No. 723808
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1994) (Order on Class
Certification).
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ty of this method, counsel seeking to certify a class
on a contested basis may choose to submit evi-
dence to show that the proposed class members'
injuries are similar in type and degree, and that
class certification is therefore proper even if causa-
tion and damage issues are considered. For exam-
ple, exposure to an irritant such as sulfuric acid
mist may produce many common injuries, such as
burning eyes and difficulty breathing, among large
numbers of exposed people.4' The success of the
latter approach will depend'upon the circumstances
of each case, including the similarities of the
degrees of exposures and types of injunes.42 The
better view is to certify the class for purposes of trial
of the common issues, reserving the individual
damages issues for post-trial proceedings.
As will be explained in the following section,
some California superior court judges have explicitly
approved class actions in toxic exposure cases,
despite the absence of directly applicable California
appellate authority. After the Kennedy decision, the
trial courts may well be called upon to compare and
contrast the facts in Kennedy from those presented by
each class certification motion to determine whether
common issues predominate over individual issues.
C. California Superior Courts Have Approved Class
Certification in Mass Toxic Tort Cases, and the
Appellate Courts Have Denied Writs of Prohibition
and Certioran as to Such Orders
In In re GCC Richmond Works,43 the coordination
trial judge issued a decision approving of a class
settlement involving over 50,000 claims for dam-
ages resulting from the release of sulfuric acid from
a tank car at defendant's facility in Richmond,
California on July 26, 1993." The decision approved
a settlement which established two opt out com-
pensatory damage classes and one mandatory
punitive damages class.45 Objections on the basis
of disparities in damages between plaintiffs were
rejected by the court, which found that iilndividual
differences in damages do not preclude class repre-
sentation," and that "Itlypicality of claims is not
required for representatives of a punitive class
where the focus is on the defendants conduct and
involves the same evidence for all claimants. 46
In approving the mandatory punitive damage
class, the court relied upon Bell v. American Title,'7
which had approved a mandatory, non opt out class
in a consumer fraud case" The court also followed
In re Agent Oraflge"9 which endorsed the mandatory
punitive damage class on the basis of a "limited
fund" theory. According to this view, where there are
multiple claimants and there is a risk that individual
litigation would allow those who sue first to deplete
the fund, leaving nothing for latecomers, then fun-
damental fairness dictates that punitive damages
should be equitably distributed to the entire class
of eligible claimants.50
The GCC decision represents a persuasive
example of the Contra Costa County Superior
court's authority to apply the class device to resolve
complex toxic tort litigation. Numerous other
California superior courts have followed similar
logic in approving of class actions in mass torts and
toxic exposure cases. Pertinent rulings include the
superior court decisions permitting class certifica-
tion for personal injuries and punitive damages in
the toxic exposure case of Alviso Community
Organization v. Macid:;" for emotional distress claims
in Noerdinger v. City of Santa Clara,'2 and City of Santa
Clara v. Santa Clara County Superior Court;"3 In re
SconcdLamb Cremation Cases5 as well as the orders of
the San Francisco County Superior court in In re
41. See part IV. infra.
42. Id.
43. No. 2906 (Contra Costa County Super. CL Nov. 22, 1995).
44. Id. (Decision Re: Final Approval, Fees and Related Matters,
Nov. 13. 1995). Class certification was opposed by a small group of
plamtiffs' counsel who obiected to the settlement as a whole, and
appeals are pending.
45. Id., slip op. at 4.
46. Id., slip op. at 11.
47. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1589 (1991).
48. Id. at 1601-1611.
49. 100 ER.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). mandamus denied. 725 E2d
858 (1984).
50. I00 ER.D. at 725 (cited in In re GCC Richmond Works,
No. 2906. Decision at 9). In the In re Eon Valdez ca s. No. A89-
0095-CV. Order No. 180 Supplement (D.C. Alaska Mar. 8. 1994)
(Decision Regarding Certification of Mandatory Punitive
Damages Class), the district court followed In reAgent Orange. and
certified a punitive damages class under the "limited punish-
ment" theory. The court found that
claimants who are first to recover may be awarded puni-
tive damages sufficient to punish and assure deterrence.
Substantive due process havAng been satisfied, later
claimants may be precluded from recovering punitive
damages. These considerations, along with due process
concerns, fit within the parameters of IFederal Rule of
Civ. Proc.1 23(b)(i)(B) in that 'adjudication with respect
to Individual members of the class ... would as a practi-
cal matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members... not parties to the adjudication ...
Id. at 9-10. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a writ
petition by plaintiffs who opposed the mandatory punitive dam-
ages class.
51. No. 723808 (Santa Clara County Super Ct. an. 19, 1994j.
52. No. 672565 (Santa Clara County Super. CL. Oct. 17. i990).
53. No. H007628 (Cal. App. Nov. 14, 1990).
54. No. 2085 (LA. Super Cr. May 10. 1993): No. S018104
(Cal. Nov. 14. 1990).
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Sacramento River Spill, certifying classes for personal
injury, property devaluation, business loss and
evacuation expenses, in a mass tort case ansing
from a train derailment and toxic injuries that were
caused by the dumping of a tankcar of herbicide
into the Sacramento River.55 The California
Supreme court and/or courts of appeal have sum-
marily denied writs of mandate and certiorari with
respect to the class certification orders in several
such cases, including Alviso and Noerdinger, cited
above. Such denials indicate that the appellate
courts are unlikely to interfere with the trial courts'
discretion to approve of the class action device to
manage complex toxic tort litigation.5 6
III. Admissibility and Necessity of Scientific
Evidence to Prove Causation of Injury
The issues pertaining to admissibility of scien-
tific evidence have been the focus of great judicial
attention in recent years. These issues are especial-
ly important in toxic tort class actions, which
depend heavily upon expert proof.57
In Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.58 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the stan-
dards for admissibility of expert opinions in federal
courts for the first time since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert assigned a "gate-
keeper" function to the federal district courts with
respect to reliability of experts' methodology and
opinions. 59 The Supreme Court declined to set forth
a "definitive checklist or test," but did cite several
factors that federal judges may consider in deter-
mining whether to admit expert scientific testimony
under Federal Rules of Evidence 702. Such consid-
erations included: whether the theory or technique
employed by the expert is generally accepted by the
scientific community; whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication; whether it can be,
and has been tested; and whether the known or
potential rate of error is acceptable.60
Interpretation of the Daubert case has generated
a great deal of disagreement among the federal dis-
55. Nos. 2617 and 2620 (S.F. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1992 and
March 3, 1993).
56. See also Kennedy. 1996 Cal. App. Lexis 245, which indi-
cates that the appellate courts are equally unlikely to interfere
with a trial court's discretionary decision not to certify a mass
tort class.
57. See, e.g., Cottle v. Superior Court. 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367
(1992), discussed infra.
58. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
59. Id. at 2798.
60. Id. at 2796-97.
61. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, Expert Testimony Since
trict and appellate courts.61 While Daubert itself
reversed a decision excluding expert testimony, it
would be a mistake to conclude that Daubert loos-
ened the standards as to expert evidence. To the
contrary, many district courts have strictly per-
formed the "gatekeeper" function to exclude' expert
evidence of toxic injury, resulting m dismissal on
summary judgment for defendants.6*'
The California Supreme Court recently declined
to adopt the Daubert standard, in a criminal case
involving admissibility of field sobriety testing.63
Instead, the court chose to retain California's Kelly
test, which requires that a particular expert opinion
must be based on a scientific principle "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs." 64 People v.
Leahy found that "'general acceptance' does not
require unanimity, a consensus of opinion, or even
majority support by the scientific community."65
Instead, the standard requires "consensus drawn
from a typical cross-section of the relevant, quali-
fied scientific community."66 The Court also made
clear that the Kelly rule only applies to "new scien-
tific techniques," and stated that the question of
whether a scientific technique is "new" for this pur-
pose depends upon whether there has been
"repeated use, study, testing and confirmation by
scientists or trained technicians." 67
Thus, the parties may engage in a preliminary
contest over whether the expert opinions offered in
the case are based on "new" scientific: techniques. If
not, then the Kelly standard is inapplicable, and
admissibility would be governed only by California
Evidence Code Section 720, which defines the qual-
ifications to testify as an expert, and Section 801,
which permits an expert to state an opinion that is
(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently
beyond common experience that the opin-
ion of an expert would assist the trier of
fact; and (b) based on matter (including his
special knowledge ... ) perceived by or per-
sonally known to the witness .... whether
Daubert: A Major Shift. Toxics LAw REPOmiR No. 5., 252-262 (Aug. 3,
1994).
62. See, e.g.. Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp.
1380 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judg'nent based upon
exclusion of expert testimony, following l)aubert). See also
Hoffman, supra note 61.
63. People v. Leahy 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (1994).
64. Id. at 667 (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30
(1976)).
65. 34 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
66. Id. at 679.
67. Id. at 674.
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or not admissible, that is of a type that rea-
sonably may be relied upon by an expert in
forming an opinion upon the subject to
which his testimony relates, unless an
expert is precluded by law from using'such
matter as a basis for his opinion.
Expert testimony is absolutely essential to
proof of causation in toxic tort cases, and recent
Calitornia appellate decisions are indicative of the
outcome-determinative impact of the battle over
admissibility of expert evidence. In Cottle v. Superior
Court, the Court of Appeal held that "Itlhe law is
well-settled that in a personal injury action causa-
tion must be proven within a reasonable medical probabil-
ity based upon competent expert testimony."6 The Court
held that plaintiffs failed to make a pnma facie case
that their injuries were caused by chemical expo-
sure, where plaintiffs' experts submitted declara-
tions that were mere "statements of possibility
instead of probability" of causation. 69 The trial court
had issued a case management order which direct-
ed each plaintiff to file a statement establishing a
prima facie claim stating the following information:
"the chemical or toxic substance to which that
plaintiff was exposed; the date or dates and place of
exposure; the method of exposure; the nature of
plaintiffs injury; and the idntity of each medical
expert who will support the plaintiffs personal
injury claim."70
Plaintiffs responded to the case management
order by stating that it was "impossible to assign
specific chemicals as having caused specific condi-
tions in specific individuals" under the circum-
stances of the case.7l Plaintiffs also admitted that
none of them "had been diagnosed as having any
illness or injury caused by exposure to the chemi-
cals."72 Plaintiffs' experts' declarations stated that
plaintiffs had been placed at significantly increased
risk, and that similar illnesses were "associated
with" toxic exposure, but did not meet the standard
of reasonable medical probability.73 Accordingly,
dismissals of plaintiffs' personal injury claims were
upheld'on appeal.74
Similarly, in Adns v. Sacramento Municipal Utilities
Distnct,75 the Third District Court of Appeal dismissed
plaintiffs' claims for alleged radiation injuries, find-
ing Insufficient expert evidence of causation. The
court devoted great attention to the issue of expo-
sure. rejecting plaintiffs' argument that it would be
"impossible to calculate potential dosages" 6 In the
absence of contrary evidence from plaintiffs, the
court accepted defense expert testimony that plain-
tiffs' exposure levels were 'trivial and insignificant."' r
The court also suggested that "a fairly accurate mea-
sure of dosage' could be produced from plaintiffs'
recollection and "extrapolation from actual test
results for pathways of exposure.'7
Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Company79 also
demonstrates the dispositive effect of the presence
or absence of evidence of exposure. In that case,
three plaintiffs filed suit against numerous asbestos
suppliers for personal injuries allegedly sustained as
a result of repeated exposure to asbestos products.
Although all three plaintiffs persuaded the jury that
they had suffered damages as a result of exposure to
asbestos, two plaintiffs suffered non-suits because
they failed to provide sufficient evidence of exposure
to asbestos manufactured by the particular defen-
dant against whom the trial had proceeded. 80 The
Court reaffirmed plaintiff's duty to establish causa-
tion to a -reasonable medical probability based
upon competent expert testimony that the defen-
dant's conduct contributed to plaintiff's injury3
One of the three plaintiffs did provide "circumstan-
tial evidence ... sufficient to support a reasonable
inference of exposure." and the Court of Appeal
reversed the non-suit as to that plaintiff only.82
Lneaweaver emphasizes the importance of
"[firequency of exposure, regularity of exposure.
and proximity of the asbestos product" to demon-
strate causation, while citing additional relevant
factors such as the type of asbestos to which plain-
tiff was exposed, the type of injury suffered, and
other possible sources of plaintiff's injury8 3
"Ultimately, the sufficiency of the evidence of cau-
sation will depend on the unique circumstances of
each case."- While Laneaweaver involved questions of
exposure which generally do not arise in a mass dis-
aster case where the defendant is readily .identifi-
68.3 Cal. App. 4th at 1367. 1384 (emphasis in onginal).
69. Id. at 1387.
70. Id. at 1373.
71. Id. at 1375.
72. Id. at 1382.
73. Id. at 1386.
74. Id. at 1389.
75. 18 Cal. App. 4th 208 (1992).
76. Id. at 235.
77. Id. at 239.
78. Id. at 235.
79.31 Cal. App. 4th 1409 (1995).
80. Id. at 1412.
81. Id. at 1416.
82. Id. at 1420.
83. Id. at 1416.
84. ILd. at 1417 (quoting ockwood v. AC & S. Inc. 109 Wash.
2d 235 (1987)).
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able, the factors cited by the Court of Appeal in
Llneaweaver are relevant to any toxic tort causation
analysis.
The appellate authorities provided in the Cottle,
Akins, and Lmneaweaver decisions clearly stand for the
proposition that plaintiffs bear the burden of pro-
viding such estimates of toxic exposure as the cir-
cumstances permit, and proving that their exposure
was sufficient to cause injury. Failure to meet the
applicable standard will result in dismissal. Thus, it
is not surprising that these expert-intensive sub-
jects give rise to a great deal of the contested issues
in toxic tort litigation, some of which are described
in section IV, below.
IV. The California Supreme Court Has Approved
of Recovery For Medical Monitoring, and Such a
Remedy Is Well-Suited for Class Certification
In Potter v. Firestone, the California Supreme
Court stated, for the first time, that medical moni-
toring is a proper form of relief for toxic exposure.8'
The Court held:
the cost of medical monitoring is a com-
pensable item of damages where the
proofs demonstrate, through reliable med-
ical expert testimony, that the need for
future monitoring is a reasonably certain
consequence of a plaintiffs' toxic exposure
and that the recommended monitoring is
reasonable. In determining the reasonable-
ness and necessity of monitoring, the fol-
lowing factors are relevant: (1) the signifi-
cance and extent of the plaintiffs exposure
to chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the chemi-
cals; (3) the relative increase in the chance
of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff
as a result of the exposure, when compared
to (a) the plaintiff's chances of developing
the disease had he or she not been
exposed, and (b) the chances of the mem-
bers of the public at large of developing the
disease; (4) the seriousness of the disease
for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the
clinical value of early detection and diag-
nosis. Under this holding, it is for the trier
of facts to decide, on the basis of compe-
tent medical testimony, whether and to
what extent the particular plaintiff's expo-
sure to toxic chemical in a given situation
justifies future periodic medical monitor-
ing.8 6
As framed by Potter, many of the issues relevant
to the availability of medical monitoring may be
common to a large number of plaintiffs, and thus
appropriate for trial on a class basis. Items 2, 4 and
5 (toxicity of the chemicals, seriousness of the dis-
ease for which the which plaintiff is a' risk, and clin-
ical value of early detection and diagnosis) will
almost always be common issues to each plaintiff,
in a mass disaster where all plaintiffs are exposed
to the same chemical. Thus, while plaintiffs and
defendants may disagree as to how toxic the chem-
icals are, or how serious the potential disease may
be, those disputes would be applicable to each
plaintiff's claim for medical monitoring. If the jury
found that the chemicals were sufficiently toxic,
and the potential disease were sufficiently serious,
those factors would support monitcring, and vice
versa. The significance and extent of plaintiffs'
exposures to chemicals can also be demonstrated
on a basis common to the entire class. Expert tes-
timony may be developed to show that all individ-
uals within a particular geographic zone were prob-
ably exposed to particular amounts of toxic chemi-
cals, and that such exposures were or were not suf-
ficient to cause a significant increase in the risk of
serious disease.87
A number of courts have found that class certi-
fication is appropriate with respect to medical mon-
itoring relief, based upon the predominance of
common issues. In Day v. NLO, Inc., 88 the federal dis-
trict court certified a medical monitoring class of
persons "allegedly exposed to dangerous levels of
radioactive materials" at a factory over a 30-year
period.8 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
defendants' attempt to reverse the district court's
order by writ of mandamus. 90 In Craft v. Vanderbilt
Univ., et al.,9i another district court in the same cir-
cuit certified several classes, including a medical
monitoring class, with respect to a group of over
800 women who allege that they ingested a radioac-
tive iron cocktail during pregnancy, without their
knowledge or consent, during an experiment con-
ducted in the 1940's at a prenatal clinic. 92 Shortly
after the Potter decision was issued, the Santa Clara
County Superior Court certified a medical monitor-
ing class in a case involving exposure to asbestos
85. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1009 (1993).
86. Id.
87. See infra parts IV and V for a discussion of the evidentiary
and practical issues pertaining to proof of exposure and injury.
88. 144 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
89. Id. at 333.
90. In re NLO. Inc., 5 F.3d 154. 159-160 (6th ir. 1993),
91. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3-94-009) (M.D. Tenn. July
14. 1994).
92. Id. (Order and Memorandum of Decision),
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and diesel fumes.93 Petitions for writs of mandate
and review were denied as to the Superior Court's
decision, by the Court of Appeal and California
Supreme Court. respectively.94
The California Supreme Court has noted that
medical monitonng relief is warranted, in part.
because of the "important public health interest in
fostering access to medical testing for individuals
whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates an
enhanced risk of disease," the "deterrence value in
recognizing medical surveillance claims" against
those who discharge toxic chemicals, and "societal
notions of fairness and elemental lustice."" In
appropriate cases, where substantial numbers of
plaintiffs have been exposed to radiation, asbestos
or other agents capable of causing cancer or other
latent illnesses, the interests of the parties and the
courts will be well-served by the efficiencies and
economies of a single, class-wide determination of
entitlement to medical monitoring damages.
V. Practical Consideiations: Proof of Causation
and Injury
The fundamental issue in any personal injury
case is whether the defendant's conduct caused or
was a substantial factor contributing to an injury
suffered by the plaintiff.96 This issue is complicated
in toxic tort mass disaster litigation in two impor-
tant ways. First, proof of toxic exposure and injury is
a highly specialized area of science and medicine,
which depends upon development of admissible
expert evidence from a number of diverse, interde-
pendent specialties. Even when the facts of a par-
ticular case clearly demonstrate negligence, defen-
dants commonly attempt to defeat or minimize
plaintiffs' claims, by motions in inune to exclude
expert testimony, and by developing defense evi-
dence to argue that the exposure in question did
not cause injury to plaintiff.9 7 Second, in a mass
exposure case, counsel must determine who the
class members are, by establishing the times and
locations where members of the community proba-
bly were exposed.
In order to address these complex issues, coun-
sel must construct a chain of proof leading from the
source of the chemical release to the plaintiffs'
93. Alnso Community Org.. No. 723808 (Santa Clara County
Supenor Court Jan. 19. 1994) (Orderon Class Ceitification). Personal
injury and property classes were also certified by the same order.
94. Maciel v. Santa Clara Superior Court, No. H012220 (6th
App- Dist. Mar. 15. 1994) (order denying petition for writ of man-
date, etc): Maciel v. Santa Clara Superior Court. No. S038890
(Cal. Apr 28. 1994) (order denying petition for review).
95. Potter. 6 Cal. 4th at 1008.
96. lineaweaver. 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1415.
alleged injuries. The links in this chain include the
following: (I) determination of the amounts and
type of chemicals released; (2) identification of
chemicals to which plaintiffs were exposed, Includ-
ing any breakdown products formed after the initial
release; (3) determination of where the chemicals
went, and in what amounts and concentrations; (4)
establishment of the types of injuries that can be
caused by particular concentrations of these chem-
icals; and (5) expert medical testimony that a par-
ticular exposure probably caused or was a substan-
tial factor contributing to the injuries alleged by
plaintiffs.
It is significant that the first four elements of
proof set forth above are common to all potential
class members in a mass toxic tort case, and such
issues are therefore well suited for determination
on a class basis, by means of a single trialY8 Only
the last step in the analysis, pertaining to proof of
injury to a particular plaintiff, requires individual-
ized adjudication. Courts have therefore allowed
class certification as to common issues of causa-
tion. while reserving issues of individual damages
for summary trial procedures. 9 Also, as a practical
matter, the aggregate of claims in the class often
make it economically feasible for the class to afford
the high cost of obtaining the best scientific evi-
dence available, while the cost would be prohibitive
if each individual plaintiff had to retain experts to
repeat the same proof.
The process of developing expert evidence of
toxic tort causation is lengthy and complex. The
attorney is not merely a conduit for information to
be provided to scientists and doctors who operate
independently to give the necessary answers.
Instead. the attorney must frame and conduct the
full range of discovery-inspections of premises,
interrogatories, requests for production of docu-
ments. depositions, and investigation through third
party sources such as government agencies--in
close cooperation with the team of experts. Only by
working closely with experts will counsel learn
which questions must be asked and gain the ability
to understand the often highly technical answers to
those questions. This approach assures that, to the
extent possible, the information needed by the
experts to formulate their opinions will be made
97. See. e.g.. Cottle. 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367. In Cottl. the Court of
Appeal upheld the Superior Courts dismissal of personal iniuw
toxic exposure dalmas based on a failure to submit expert evi-
dence making out a prma aw case.
98. See. eg., Sterling. 855 F2d at 1196-97.
99. Se. e.g.. Imnfdns. 782 F2d 468: Sterfing. 855 F2d at 1188:
AIrso Community Org.. No. 723808 (Santa Clara County Super. Cr.
Jan. 19, 1994).
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available to them, in a timely manner, and that the
attorney will be sufficiently familiar with the mater-
ial to present it at trial.
The following is a brief description of the steps
required to prove injury in an airborne toxic expo-
sure case, along with a description of some of the
principal issues and the types of experts needed to
address them. Many of the same, or analogous,
issues will arise in any mass toxic tort case, regard-
less of the type of incident or exposure pathway.
A. The Amount of Chemicals Released
The foundation of the plaintiffs proof of causa-
tion in a toxic tort is the amount of chemicals
released by defendants. The amount of the initial
release is the critical factor that determines the con-
centration of chemicals to.which residents down-
wind of the discharge may have been exposed. The
concentration, and the length of time of exposure,
determine whether a plaintiff received a "dose" suf-
ficient to cause injury, according to established tox-
icological standards, and the amount of the release
is a major common issue affecting all class mem-
bers. Thus, every toxic tort case involves a battle
between plaintiffs and defendants, to determine the
amount of the chemical discharge. The following
examples are typical.
In the immediate aftermath of the Sacramento
River Spill, Southern Pacific Transportation
Company ("SP") issued statements to public agen-
cies indicating that only approximately 200 to 500
gallons of the herbicide metam sodium had leaked
into the river from the railcar100 When daylight
came, SP employees discovered a hole on the
underside of the railcar, and SP then estimated that
approximately 2/3 of the railcar's contents, or about
12,000-13,000 gallons, had leaked into the river.101
SP's position was based upon its finding that the
level of liquid measured approximately 1/3 of the
way up the railcar as it rested in the riverbed.
However, when SP pumped out and discarded the
contents of the railcar, a hazardous waste analysis
was required by the receiving facility. This analysis
indicated that most of the liquid in the railcar after
the incident was river water, and that only a very low
percentage of herbicide remained. Eventually, in
verified responses to interrogatories, SP acknowl-
edged that the actual amount of herbicide dis-
charged into the river was between 19,534 and
19,605 gallons, out of a total tankcar capacity of
20,240 gallons. 102 Thus, the figure of approximately
19,000 gallons was ultimately used 'by the State of
California Environmental Protection Agency, and by
plaintiffs' experts, as the basis for the calculations
of the airborne toxic cloud released from the surface
of the Sacramento River following the spill.
An analogous dispute arose ii the General
Chemical sulfuric acid case. In August, 1993, GCC
prepared and issued a report which calculated the
amount of the sulfur trioxide (SO 3) discharged from
the tank car at 3.9 tons, and this figure was relied
upon by defendant in numerous submissions to
public agencies concerning the incident. 103
However, plaintiffs' investigations through docu-
ment production, interrogatories, inspection of the
railcar and a series of depositions, in conjunction
with expert analysis, demonstrated a reasonable
probability that the actual amount of S03 dis-
charged to the atmosphere was at least 8.0 tons. 104
The settlement approved by the Superior Court in
the fall of 1995 included a "plume," cr physical rep-
resentation of the toxic cloud, based upon an
assumption of an 8 ton discharge.105
Similar issues can be anticipated in any mass
disaster toxic tort case. It is in defendants' interest
to minimize the estimated amount of the release,
in order to minimize the resulting exposures and
injury potential. Plaintiffs' interests are just the
opposite. Counsel representing parties in such
cases must retain highly-qualified chemists famil-
iar with the particular manufacturing processes
and chemicals involved, in order to properly ana-
lyze the activities that led to the incidents, to
guide discovery of the facts necessarl to determine
the amount of the release, and then to calculate
the amount that was probably discharged to the
atmosphere. The importance of this expert analy-
sis is magnified by the high probability that the
toxic release resulted from an accidental, inher-
ently unusual event that was not subject to con-
temporaneous or definitive measurement of the
actual amount of the discharge.
100. Why Spill Went Unchecked. SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, July
16, 1991, at AI2.
I01. SP Crew Blames Spill on Engine. SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Aug. 2. 1991, at A23; CAUFORNIA OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
HAZARD ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL FACT SHEET METAM SODIUM 1 (Aug. 5,
1991) (draft).
102. Southern Pacific Transportation Company's Answers to
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatones, No. 10., In re Sacramento
Spill Cases I & ii. No. 2617, 2620 (S.F. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 1993).
103. Joint Decl. Of Thomas F. Schrag and Donald C. Arbitblit,
In re GCC Richmond Works, No. 2906 (Contra Costa County Super
Ct. Nov. 22, 1995) (para. 16-20); see Decl. of Debra Belaga, In re
GCC Richmond Works (Exh. 1-4).
I04. Joint Decl. Of Schrag and Arbitblit, supra note 103. All of
the SO3 mixed with atmospheric moisture to form the sulfuric
acid mist that was carried downwind. ComRA COSTA CouNTY
HEALTH SERVICES DEPT.. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE: CHEMICAL
RELEASE IN RICHMOND (July 28. 1993).
105. joint Decl. of Schrag and Arbitblit, supra note 103,
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B. Identification of the Chemicals to Which
Plaintiffs Were Exposed.
After the amount of the toxic discharge has
been determined, counsel and their experts must
determine whether the chemicals that were dis-
charged to the atmosphere remained in the same
form or converted into other substances due to
interaction with environmental chemicals and/or
photochemical reactions. All of the subsequent tox-
icology research and proof of exposure and injuries
depends upon accurate identification of the chemi-
cals to which plaintiffs were actually exposed, and
not merely those that were released during the inci-
dent. This analysis requires consultation with an
atmosphenc chemist familiar with such processes.
For example, in the Sacramento River Spill case,
consulting scientists concluded that the herbicide
metam sodium mixed with river water and then
broke down into various chemicals, the most signif-
icant of which were methyl isothiocyanate (MITC),
and hydrogen sulfide.i° 6 Toxicology literature
searches demonstrated that each of these chemi-
cals had unique injurious properties. A batfle of the
experts was waged as to the amount of each chem-
ical present in the atmosphere in the Sacramento
River canyon at different stages following the derail-
ment. One of the central disputed issues pertained
to the increased rate of breakdown of metam sodi-
um in the presence of sunlight. Since the derail-
ment happened at night, it was important to deter-
mine the rate at which the herbicide left the railcar,
the rate at which the materials were carried down-
stream toward populated areas, especially the near-
est towns of Dunsmuir and Castella, the locations
of the plume on its course towards Shasta Lake, and
the times when the plume was exposed to sunlight.
These facts were necessary to estimate the atmos-
phenc concentrations as accurately as possible for
each location, in order to calculate plaintiffs' expo-
sures. Because of the remoteness of the location of
the spill, State Air Resources Board personnel did
not obtain reliable atmospheric samples until
July 17, 1991, three days after the incident, and sub-
stantially after the peak exposures had occurred.
The absence of sufficient air quality sampling data
is common in mass disaster cases, because of the
sudden nature of the incidents and the broad areas
106. James Cone et al. Persistent Respiratory Health Effeats afr a
Metam Sodium Pesticide Spill, CHEsT 500-508 (Aug. 1994).
107. Edward 1. Shields, Analysis of what Caused the S03 Relase
at General Cfhemical Corporation's Richmond Facility on July 26. in
Declaration of Debra Belaga, supra note 103 (filed June 19. 1995
as Attach. 1 to Exh. 3).
108. Com' CosTA CouNTm HEATHm S~vrccs DET.. supra note
104.
affected by the discharges, leaving substantial room
for expert debate.
In contrast to the Sacramento River Spill, the
atmospheric chemistry in the General Chemical
case was remarkably straightforward. Sulfur trioxide
(SO3) gas was expelled through a hole in the top of
a railcar, at high pressures created by the overheat-
ing of the railcar's contents.107 The SO3 quickly
mixed with atmospheric moisture (H20) to form
sulfuric acid mist (H2SO). 103 Consulting chemists
ruled out the possibility that sulfuric acid could
convert to other chemicals in the atmosphere. Thus,
plaintiffs' toxicology consultants were able to limit
their literature review and analysis to the injurious
properties of sulfunc acid alone. 09
C. The Scope and Pathway of the Chemical Plume
After determining the amount and identityof the
chemical(s) at issue, the next critical step in the
expert analysis is to determine where the chemicals
traveled, and in what concentrations. In the case of
an airborne toxic discharge, these questions are
answered by a "plume study.- Briefly stated, a plume
study is a computer-generated model showing the
geographic contours of the cloud of toxic materials,
as well as the concentrations of the toxic materials at
locations within those contours, over time. The
plume image is then superimposed onto a street
map, so that plaintiffs' probable exposures at partic-
ular times and locations can be determined. The
need to prove exposure is a common issue affecting
all plaintiffs, such that class treatment is appropriate.
Computer modeling programs were initially
developed in the 1950's, to estimate exposure to
radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions. Many
such programs have since been developed, and
computer modeling is widely approved and used by
federal and state regulatory agencies, both to pre-
dict exposures from known, regulated sources and
to estimate exposures caused by accidental dis-
charges.'i0 These models vary greatly in their degree
of sophistication and applicability to particular cir-
cumstances. Some of the more advanced models
are capable of taking into account the effects of the
topography downwind from the site of the release,
the size of the partides or droplets discharged, the
rise of the plume after its discharge, and the rate of
109. As discussed in part IV(D) Infra. this seeming simplicity
did not resolve the matter of toxic exposure and proof of injury.
in the GCC case. instead. the question of injunous effects at par-
ticular le-els of concentration was hotly contested, based on con-
flicting medical and toxicological literature.
110. Ded. Of Walter Dabberdt. Ph.D. at para. 5. June 20.
1995. In re GCC Richmond Works. No. 2906 (Contra Costa County
Super. CL Nov. 22. 1995).
Sonna 1996 Eff, We of Qms Aff tedif er:s h Warrfa To=c Tort lMdon
Donld C. Arbitblit and Wigiam Bernstein Vlm .Nme
fallout or deposition of such particles or droplets.
The reliability of a plume study will depend in part
upon its suitability for the particular incident.
Counsel should anticipate an expert battle over the
type of model used, the validity of the information
entered to the program, and the admissibility of the
resulting model.
Computer models of a chemical plume are gen-
erally created under the supervision and direction
of an expert in the field of atmospheric transport
modeling. Such experts commonly work with a
meteorologist to gather and analyze wind and
weather data from governmental and industrial
sources, in order to obtain some of the essential
information to run the program that produces the
model. The atmospheric transport modeler will also
work with a chemist capable of providing computer-
readable data stating the amounts and rates of
release of each chemical. Obtaining the information
required to run the modeling program requires con-
siderable time, effort and discovery. It is essential to
begin that process long before the air transport
modeler needs the data, in order to assure that
results are available to consulting toxicologists and
physicians well before trial.
D. The Types of Injuries That Can Be Caused by
Particular Concentrations of Particular Chemicals
In order to determine the toxic properties of
particular chemicals, and the types of injuries they
can cause, counsel will consult with experts in the
field of toxicology. Such experts may be physicians
qualified to diagnose particular toxic exposure
injuries, or they may be non-medical scientists. In
either case, the specialist will conduct a literature
review to determine the available information as to
the toxicity of each substance to which plaintiffs
were exposed. In cases of major incidents such as
the Sacramento River spill, or General Chemical
sulfuric acid exposure, state and county agencies
generally conduct investigations of the health
effects of the incidents, which may include such a
toxicology literature review."
The types and extent of injunes caused by toxic
exposures are rife with controversy among scientists
and doctors themselves. Naturally, these controver-
sies carry over into the litigation arena. For example,
iii. California Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment ("OEHHA-) is a branch of the California
Environmental Protection Agency which issued such reports in
both the Sacramento River spill and GCC cases.
112. CAUFOuRIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. OEHHA,
ToXIcoLoGIc EFFEcTs OF OILEUM AND SuLr'uRic ACID 13 (Jan. 1994).
113. Decl. of Debra Belaga, supra note i03.
114. Settlement Agreement, In re GCC Richmond works, No.
in the GCC case, a State agency Issued a report
establishing a threshold level of 0.2 mg of sulfuric
acid per cubic meter of air (0.2 mg/ 3), which the
report concluded would be sufficient to cause an irri-
tant injury to sensitive individuals.i12 However,
defendant relied upon the standards of the American
Congress of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) which state that no health effects were
expected among working adults exposed to 1.0
mg/1 3 of sulfuric acid for an 8-hour (lay, working 50
weeks per year. Defendant contended that the state
report was not supported by existing data, and indi-
cated its intention to move to dismiss injury claims
by persons exposed to less than 1.0mmg/i 3 if the case
were not settled.ii 3 Plaintiffs, on the ol:her hand, con-
tended that the ACGIH 'standards applied only to
healthy working adults, and not to a community that
includes persons known to be more sensitive, such
as infants, the elderly, and those with pre-existing
respiratory conditions. Ultimately, the GCC settle-
ment adopted the 0.2 mg/m 3 standard as a baseline
for eligibility to seek enhanced compensation for
serious injunes, but imposed further proof require-
ments, including documentation of medical visits,
persistent symptoms, and medicaticn, in order to
obtain such compensation. 1 4 The settlement repre-
sented a compromise between views that would have
been hotly contested at trial.
In many toxic tort cases, issues will arise as to the
validity of laboratory experiments on animals for the
purpose of proving the potential for harm to
humans.' 5 Other cases may involve controversies
over the admissibility or weight given to epidemiolo-
gy studies. An epidemiology study compares the inci-
dence of a particular disease among persons exposed
to an identified risk factor to the normal incidence of
the disease in the general population. Where a statis-
tically significant difference is found by the study,
some courts permit experts to testify that the study
demonstrates causation of injury to a particular indi-
vidual. ]1i6 In other cases, courts have permitted con-
sideration of epidemiological studies in conjunction
with other medical evidence to establis.h causation." 17
E. Medical Proof of Injury to a Particular Plaintiff
The final link in the chain of proof of toxic injury
causation is the doctor's opinion, that, to a reason-
2906 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nov, 22, 1995) (filed
June 20, 1995).
115. See. e.g., Potter. 6 Cal. 4th at 989.
116. See, eg., Cantrell v. OAF Corp., 999 E2d 1007, 1013-14
(6th Cir. 1993).
117. See, e.g., Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482,
1485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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able degree of medical probability, the chemical
exposure caused or was a substantial contributing
factor to the alleged injury."8 The reliability and
admissibility of such an opinion depends not only
upon the doctors qualifications as an expert, but
also upon the type and quality of evidence developed
to support that opinion. Have the chemists provided
reliable calculations of the amount of toxic materials
initially discharged, and identification of atmospher-
ic breakdown products? Has the atmospheric trans-
port modeler used that information, together with
meteorological data, to demonstrate the probable
exposure to a particular plaintiff at a specific time
and location, using techniques and computer mod-
els that are generally accepted in the relevant scien-
tific community? Has the toxicologist conducted a
thorough search of the literature to determine that
the exposure suffered by the plaintiff is sufficient to
cause the type of injury that plaintiff alleges? If so.
then the underlying information is of the type that
"reasonably may be relied upon by la medical] expert
in forming an opinion"" 9 as to causation.
The background information provided to the
physician by other experts is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, to prove the cause of an injury. The physician
must also examine the patient's medical records from
before and after the exposure in question, to deter-
mine whether the alleged injury may have resulted
from an alternative -cause. For example, in Potter v.
Firestone, the Califomia Supreme Court held that the
jury could consider evidence of cigarette smoking as
an alternative cause for plaintiffs' fear of cancer and
emotional distress.'2 Family histories and predisposi-
tions are also relevant. The physician should conduct
a clinical examination of the patient, and the failure to
do so may result in exclusion of the expert opinion.!2'
Expert physicians will engage in vigorous debate
as to the injuries potentially caused by particular
exposures. Thus, in the Sacramento River spill cases,
defendant SP filed expert declarations contending
that the exposures that followed the spill were insuffi-
118. See part Ill. infra.
119. Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (b) (West 1996).
120. 6 Cal. 4th at 1010-12.
121. See. e.g.. In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation. 35 E3d
717 (3d Cir. 1994). Defendants will argue that such individual
issues of damages predominate over comon issues in order to
defeat class actions: however, most courts understand that Indi-
vidual issues of damages do not defeat class certification. See.
e.g.. Sterling, 855 E2d at 1188.
122. Decl. Of Dr., Hams Busch. Dr. John Salvaggio. and Dr.
Henry Simmons. In Support of Sourthem Pacific's Opposition to
Plaintiffs" Motion for Class Certification. In re Sacramento River
Spill Cases, No. I & i. No. 2617. 2620 (S.E Super. Ct. May 20.
1992).
123. Cone et aL. supra note 106. at 503-307.
124. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
aent to cause any injuries other than short term irri-
tation.'2 However. in response to numerous com-
plaints of long lasting injuries, plaintiffs' counsel
arranged for medical evaluations by physicians from
the Department of Medicine and Center for
Occulj5,tional and Environmental Health of the
University of California at San Francisco. This research
resulted in publication of a peer-reviewed article in a
major professional journal, which documented long
term respiratory injuries to exposed members of the
community12 3 The peer review process is a significant
indicator of the reliability of expert evidence 2 and
the research conducted by well-qualified pulmonolo-
gists and occupational health physicians was essen-
tial to establish proof of injury.
The types of medical specialties that may be
required in a toxic exposure case are as vaned as the
injunes themselves. As in the Sacramento River Spill
case, an airbome irritant may cause aggravation of
asthma or the new onset of an asthma-like condition.
requiring consultation with pulmomologists and
occupational health physiaans.25 An oncologist spe-
cializing in toxic exposures would be consulted in the
event that the literature search indicates that the tox-
ics in question are carcinogenic. 26 A debate exists in
both the legal and medical communities as to whether
toxic chemicals cause damage to the immune system,
and the admissibility of an immunologist's testimony
in such a case may well be subject to the "new scien-
tific evidence" standard of People v. Kelly.i27
As a practical matter, in the event of an irritant
exposure, early medical examination and treatment
may be critical to plaintiffs ability to prove injury.
Respiratory effects would normally be expected with-
in twenty-four hours after the initial exposure 25 and
an early medical visit will document both the exis-
tence and severity of the condition, or the converse.
On the other hand, many carcinogenic chemicals
have long latency periods, and plaintiffs may not even
know that they are being exposed to such substances
for years after the exposure has taken place. 29
125. Sm. e.g.. Cone et al. supra note 106.
126. Sme. e.g.. P tLet. 6 Cal. 4th at 977-78.
127. Se. e.g.. U. at 981-84 (discussing the effect of the -new
scientific evidence standard of Kelly. 17 Cal. 3d at 24). The
California Supreme Court described the differing conditions
reached by different courts, and ultimately held that it lacked -an
appropnate factual record for resovi;ng whether impairments to
the immune response system or cellular damage constitutes a
physical Injury for which parasitic damages for emotional distress
ought to be available." L. at 984.
128. Cone et al.. supra note 106. at 503.
129. See. eg.. Polter. 6 Cal. 4th at 975-76. in that case.
Firestone had dumped toxic wastes between 1963 and 1930. The
materials leached Into the ground water and caused contamina-
tion by a number of chemicals that were known carcinogens, and
others that were strongly suspected to be carcinogens. Plaintiffs
did not discover the contamination of their wells until 1984.
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F. Summary
As demonstrated above, proof of injury in a
toxic tort class action is a complex process requir-
ing the attorney to conduct early, thorough and on-
going discovery and investigation into the amounts
of toxic chemicals discharged, identification of the
chemicals and breakdown products to which plain-
tiffs were exposed, the scope and direction of the
toxic plume, the toxicity of the chemicals in ques-
tion, and the likelihood that a particular exposure
probably caused inlury. Each link in the chain of
causation will be the subject of expert debate.
California cases concerning toxic injuries demon-
strate that the likelihood of success at trial, and, in
some cases, whether plaintiffs may proceed past
the summary judgment stage, will depend upon the
ability of counsel to develop admissible expert evi-
dence supporting, or opposing, causation.
VI. Conclusion
The class action device is a superior method for
resolving the multitude of claims arising from mass
disaster toxic torts, which occur all too frequently in
our modern, chemically-dependent society. The
class procedure allows for a single trial of liability,
punative damages and common issues pertaining
to causation, preventing costly, repetitive litigation
of the same matters by hundreds or thousands or
,plaintiffs. Global resolution of claims can be accom-
plished in a unified proceeding, and damages can
be fairly distributed to all claimants under court
supervision. Punitive damage classes may be
ordered on a mandatory basis, as in the Agent
Orange, Exxon Valdez, and GCC cases, under either the
limited punishment or limited fund theories. In
light of the substantial expenditures of time and
money required to develop scientific and medical
evidence in this expert-intensive field, resolution of
common issues in a single trial is a practical neces-
sity that allows all legitimate claimants to have
their day in court.
